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motion for 
any continue to 
commit crime. 
[4] Id.-After Conviction and Pending AppeaL--It was not an 
a conyictPd deftmdant 
who at 
motions 
that there were strong indications that defendant h11d engaged 
in other criminal activities and after the trial, 




view that there 
was no evidence support claim of economic 
and his belief that no substantial in the trial 
of the case would be shown on 
PROCEEDING 
and .t•c:eu~lllUl,H\Ot, 
McK. Dig. References: 2, 4] Bail, § 5; [3] 
to bail 
denied. 






iJ so, whether the refusal constituted an almse of dis-
(·rrtion. 
After the verdict ~was returned he remained 
at large on bail for about six \Yeeks while his motion for 
probation was pending. On the eonrt denied 
probation in aecordanee vvith the recommendation of the pro-
bation ofiic:er 's and sentenced to he confined in 
state prison for the term prescribed His motion for 
bail pending appeal was also denied. 
tenee was stayed May 31. 
On May 29, a sec:ond motion for bail was made. It was 
argued that S(:aggs owned a hotel whieli vn1:-; lJt•ing eOJJYertecl 
inio apartmellts and that it was in tlie amonllt of 
$72,000 and would be lost by foreclosure Hllless he were ad-
Ill it ted to baiL The motion ~was t1enied. 
On ,July 13, Scaggs made a thlr·cl motion for bail, and, by 
way of indicating additional eiremnstanccs which had arisen 
after the court's ruling on l\fay 29, he pointed to the illness 
of his wife, who was in the hospital f'or surgrry, and to our 
clel,ision in In re 46 Cal.2d 810 P.2<1 2171. 
!J1 again denying the motiou, the court stated, "\Ve11, as I 
read the Brumback case, they hold what we felt 1vas the 1aw 
at the time of the original ruling on this applieation for hail. 
The trial court had it within its discretion to admit or deny 
arlmission to bail on aprwal. ... The Court rxereisec1 its 
1liseretion at that time ami, in collsideration of all the eir-
eumsiances, decided that no order fixing bail would be made . 
. . . I don't think the situation hm; changed, at aU. Not11ing 
substantial has been brought to the attention of the Court 
that woulrl warrant granting of bail to this Defendant." In 
response to a remark by counsel that the eonrt had stated 





defendant before and after con-
both the statutes and 
Cali and arisrt~ from the fact 
the defendant loses the benefit of the 
of innoeenee and is to be guilty. ( Crirn. Prac. Aet 
Voll (1 , ,n Cal. 32 
so far as c'ases co11 uiction were coneerned, 
of the 1849 Constitution that ''All persons shall 
when the 
i ntendecl 
suffieient unless for capital offenses 
is evident or the presumption great" was not 
alter the common-law rule that applications for 
bail addressed to the discretion of the ; Ex parte 
, 68 CaL 176, 177 [8 P. [reaching the 
same result 
without 
·with to that provision as incorporated, 
in f'rdion G of artidr [ of the 
1879 .) 
[2] It is thus clear that s(~aggs, having been convicted 
of a and sPnteneed to imprisonment, was not entitled 
to be admitted to bail as a matter of right but was compelled 
to address himself to the discretion of the court. In In re 
46 Cal.2d 810 P.2d 217], after recognizing 
that the discretion in such a ease belongs primarily to the 
trial court and is to be exeeeised in the light of all ol' the 
attending we held thot the trial eourt may not 
*Section 1270 of the Penni Code : ''A rlefendant charged 
with an offensn rmnishablo with cannot be admitted to bail, when 
is evident or the presumption thereof great. 'The 
does not add to the strength of the proof or the 
,.,.,,onm,;ti<m< to he drawn therefrom.'' 
1:271 of the PPnal Code 
other offense, he may be admitted 
: "If the charge is for any 
bail hefore conviction, as matter 
of 
] :272 of the Pennl Cocle provides: "After conviction of an 
offen~e not with death, dcfen<lant who has appealed may 
be to hnil: 
'' 1. A.~ a nmttor of right, wlwn thr appenl is from a judgment im-
a fine 
" As a of right, when the nppeal is from a judgment im-
posing imprisonment in cases of misdemeanor. 
"3. As a matter of discretion in all other cases." 
Nov.l956] IN RE ScAGGS 419 
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decline to exercise that discretion. the court in the 
case used on May 29 which be con-
strued as indicating that it was declining to exercise its dis-
cretion, it undertook to dispel any doubt in that 
stating on ,July 13 that, in the motion for 
bail, it had the law as set forth in the Brumback case. 
In any it is immaterial whether the court failed to 
exercise its discretion on May 29, since the record shows that 
it did so on July 13 in its final on the motion 
for bail. 
There remains the question of whether the refusal to admit 
Scaggs to bail constituted an abuse of discretion. [3] Al-
though, as we have said, the purpose of bail is to 
assure the presence of the defendant in court when 
(see In re Brumback, 46 Cal.2d 813 [299 P.2d 217]), it 
does not, of course, follow that other matters may not be con-
sidered in determining whether a convicted defendant should 
be retained in custody pending his appeal. Obviously, one 
important consideration is whether there is any danger that, 
if released, he would continue to commit crime. [4] In an 
affidavit filed in this proceeding, Judge Caulfield, who pre-
sided at the trial and denied the motions for bail, states that 
there were "strong indications that he [Scaggs] had engaged 
in other criminal activities before, during and even after the 
trial." As additional factors upon which his denial of the 
motions was based, Judge Caulfield includes the unfavorable 
recommendation of the probation officer, the fact that, after 
his conviction, Scaggs was at liberty for several weeks during 
which he had an opportunity to put his affairs in order, the 
judge's view that there was no convincing evidence to sup-
port the claim of economic hardship, and his belief that no 
substantial errors in the trial of the case would be s11own on 
appeaL We are satisfied that there was no abuse of discretion 
in refusing to admit Scaggs to bail. 
The order to show cause is discharged, and the writ is 
denied. 
Shenk, J., Traynor, .T., and concurred. 
McComb, ,T., concurred in the order the writ. 
CARTER, ,J.-I dissent. 
It appears from the record before us that Pleas 
was found guilty of violating the provisions of section 496 
420 IN RE ScAGGs [47 C.2d 
certain stolen 
and County of 






was made and denied. 
a motion was made in 
Scaggs to bail pending 
This motion was denied. On May 29, 
motion for the admission of Scaggs to bail 
made in the trial court and the record 
first of your Honor please, the 
health is not involved in at all, but that is not 
the 1aw. As the Court has said that where a condition is so 
serious that bail should be then it should be granted. 
'' 'i'IIE Couwr : ' health isn't involved here. 
"MR. DuAxE: No of this. This is a matter purely 
IYithin your Honor's that is all. 
''THE CouRT: Witlu:n the limits set down the decisions. 
"MR. DuANE: ·what is your Honod 
"TnE CouRT Within the limit set down the decisions. 
One is discovered evidence and the other is health. 
"MR. DuANE: that is and any others. 
"THE CouRT: I will state now that I don't consider 
health very cause, because they can secure just 
as if not better medical care in custody, as they can out. 
"MR. DUANE: That is but aside from that, Counsel 
is incorrect when he says that this work has been on 
for four years; that is not true. I have gone up there, seen 
the I know what goes on and I know Scagg himself 
there and he has workmen there, but since 
been able to pay any help and 
deed trust him in the 
''THE CouRT: Economic is not one of the reasons 
for discretion. 
"MR. DuANE: if the Court please, the courts 
have held >vhere there are circumstances-
doesn't go into detail as to what the circnmstances may 
be-but there are a of cases referred to, propositions 
where a man 
the conviction he showed 
but in this case, 
of these affairs for 
will lose 
'' 'fHE CouRT: matter is 
'' Mn. BERlifAN: Submitted. 
'· 1'rm CouRT: Mr. you 
421 
been murdered and after 
of of that 
care 
he 
ness. 'l'here is a rule of moral la-vv, that we 
have to be just before we are generous and there is a rule of 
law that controls the Court that we have to conform to the 
law before we consider any other element. 
"MR. DuANE: That is and the presumes fairness 
in laying down its 
["THE CouRT:] The case we have before us is a case of a 
convicted felon. All the presumptions of innocence are gone. 
I was fair to him. I didn't order him into im-
mediately upon conviction. I could have done that. I had 
this other situation in mind. I also had in mind the fact that 
his accomplice in crime, Mr. was at liberty and I 
didn't see fit to take his liberty away from him at that time. 
And I assume that the six or seven weeks he had from the 
time he became a convicted felon until sentence was formally 
passed upon, that he would act as a man and get hi" 
business affairs in if his business affairs are of such 
81lape that he is going to be prejudiced by to San 
Quentin. That situation is of his making; not of yours or of 
n1lne. 
"MR. DUANE: \Veil, it is only a question of permitting him 
to remain at liberty. 
"THE CouRT: I know that, but justiee is justice 
denied and I am not going to be a to this man 's---- a 
eouvieted felon-- roaming the streets for a month or two 
months until this case is decided on 
"The motion for bail is denied." (Emphasis added.) 
On July 13, 1956, counsel for Scaggs moved the trial 
court that Scaggs be admitted to bail pending appeal, and 
the record discloses the following: 
"MR. DuANE: There are only two new features in it. One 
is that Mrs. Scaggs, the wife of the Defendant, is in the 
hospital for an operation and in view of the Supreme Court 
decisions on the Brumback case 'iVe feel that we have a good 
meritorious argument in support of our application. 
''THE CoURT: Well, as I read the Brumback case, they 
the the time of the 
for bail. The trial court had it 
admission to bail on 
exercised its discretion at that 
of all the deeided 
to the Court's 
are, of Mrs. Scaggs, 
and the Brumback decision. 
"MR. DuANE: the other matters have been gone into. 
''THE CouRT : Yes. 
":M:R. DuANE: I have set up there the financial condition, 
the loss of this hotel business, loss of the property, the whole 
thing. There is some $64,000 involved in it and he will lose 
the whole thing. Now, it is not going to do anyone any harm 
to him to remain on bail pending the appeal, at which 
time he can get his affairs all cleared up. 
"THE CouRT: I don't think the situation has changed, at all. 
substantial has been brought to the attention of the 
Court that would ·warrant granting of bail to this Defendant. 
"MR. DuANE: ·well, your Honor made the statement that it 
was contrary to your policy to grant bail in these cases. 
'' 'rm~; CouRT : In this type of case. 
"MR. DUANE: Yes. 
''THE CouRT: \v!wre the facts were as they appeared in 
this case, I ·would not grant bail. 
''MR. DuANE: And I don't believe that is a proper use of 
diseretion, 
"THE CouRT: Well, you can ask the .Appellate Court to 
review the Court's discretion. That is perfectly proper. 
That would be a proper exercise of discretion on your part." 
Thereafter applieation for a writ of habeas corpus for and 
on behalf of Seaggs for bail on appeal was submitted to the 
District Court of Appeal and denied without an opinion. 
On September 7, 1956, petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
for bail on appeal on behalf of Scaggs was presented to this 
court and an order to show eause why he should not be ad-
mitted to bail was issued and the matter eame on for hearing 
before this court on October 10, 1956. 
The reeord before us discloses that Scaggs has been for 
many years a resident of the city and eounty of San Francisco 
and is the owner of real property of the estimated value of 
Nov. IN RE ScAoos 423 
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$100,000 that he is married and lives with his wife in an 
apartment owned by him and that he no criminal 
record. 
At the before this court the pre-
sented the affidavit of Honorable C. Harold the 
judge who at the trial of and ruled on the 
various motions for the admission of to baiL In said 
affidavit the states as follows: 
''At the time of sentence a motion for 
release on bail 
the ground that he was m "'""'"'.,..n 
apartment house, that this work \vas 
economic hardship and financial loss would result unless he 
were allowed to remain on bail. I gave careful consideration 
to the representations thus made and the evidence in support 
thereof. The record sho·ws that the work referred to had been 
in slow process for several years and nothing about it appeared 
to be so unique as to prevent adequate arrangements for its 
conservation and supervision from being made. The defend-
ant's wife and others made personal repres0ntations to the 
court in connection with this claim of economic hardship, but 
neither the claim nor the representations thus made were 
supported by substantial, convincing evidence. On the other 
hand I considered the probation report, the apparent unrelia-
bility and dishonesty of the defendant, and certain strong 
indications that he had engaged in other criminal activities 
before, during and even after the trial, as factors weighing 
against his release. Lastly, in my judgment there were no 
such substantial errors of law involved in this trial as to 
present a substantial issue on appeal. 
''Considering all these factors, it was determined that the 
interests of society would best be served by ordering the 
defendant into custody and such order was made on May 15, 
1956. 
"It was thereafter represented that the defendant required 
still further time in which to take care of his personal affairs, 
and although in my judgment he had had ample time to make 
such arrangements, he was granted a stay of execution for 
a period of 14 days to and including May 29, 1956. 
''Subsequently there was presented an additional motion 
for an order fixing bail on appeal. This motion was based 
on the same representations which had previously been con-
sidered. Nothing new was presented. Under the circum-




Ju:s presence ·1:s 
upon the merits of 
will not be disturbed unless a 
manifest abuse of discretion appears or 'circum-
stances of an character have intervened since 
conviction 'Shieh make such action proper.' ... 
''There appears to be no case in \Yhich it has bern held 
that this test limits the discretion of the trial judge. vVerr 
that rule as the trial judge did in this instance it 
would virtually nullify section 1272, subdivision 3, for it 
would preclude a successful early application for bail and 
necessitate defendant's serving part of his term in the peni-
tentiary or sojourning in jail until some new and untoward 
and like illness or discovery of new 
circumstances cannot prevent the trial 
from acting or excuse his failure to although their 
presence properly may influenee his diseretion. It follows that 
the judge in the instance mistakenly declined to 
exereise his 
"It is true that the discretion in the matter of 
bail on resides in the trial court but it is not correct 
to say that '[i]t has been the law in this state that 
the discretion referred to in section 1272 of the Penal Code ... 
is not a diseretion conferred upon the 
stated in People v. G7 
675] ; and the cases cited on page 839 c1o not support that 
proposition. There is no question of power here presented. 
The Constitution VI, §§ 4 and 4b) confers upon the 
Court and the Distriet Courts of Appeal and each 
individual the to issue the writ of habeas corpus, 
and Penal seetiou 1490, makes it a propPr avenue for 
obtaining bail. rrhc of extraordinary 
Nov. IN RE ScAGGS 425 
f 47 C.2d 416; 303 P.2d 1009] 
circumsta.nees is a eriterion for the guidance of 
appellate courts and individual appellate justices in the exer-
cise of a sound judicial discretion. 'l'he cardinal rule is that 
manifest abuse of discretion must appear as a basis for the 
exercise of a sound discretion by an appellate court or justice; 
the intervening circumstance test is a supplementary one 
designed to enable the court of review to do justice even 
though it has become too late for the trial judge to do so. It 
operates by way of enlargement of the concept of permissible 
discretion and not as a restriction upon the power of trial or 
appellate court. In any event that test is not exclusive. The 
trial judge may grant bail in his discretion though no inter-
vening circumstance has occurred and the appellate court may 
act where an abuse of discretion appears regardless of the 
existence of intervening extraordinary circumstanees. But if 
they have occurred affirmative action by the upper court may 
be appropriate though no abuse of diseretion in the trial court 
appears. In the present instance no discretion was exercised 
below and no intervening circumstances now appear. Appel-
lant is entitled to have his applieation considered on the 
merits but not in this eourt at this time." (Emphasis added.) 
Applying the foregoing rules to the case at bar, I am of 
the opinion that the trial judge abused his diseretion in 
refusing to admit Scaggs to bail pending appeal. The offense 
of which Scaggs was convicted is clearly a bailable offense 
(see Cal. Const., art. I, § 6; Pen. Code, § 1272). There is 
nothing in the record from which a reasonable mind could 
conelude that Seaggs, if admitted to bail in a reasonable sum, 
would not attend upon the court when his presence is required. 
In fact, the record discloses that Scaggs remained at large 
for a period of over two months after conviction upon the bail 
which he had posted prior to conviction. In my opinion it 
was a manifest abuse of discretion on the part of the trial 
judge to refuse to fix bail in any sum whatsoever in a case 
of this character. It is apparent from the remarks of the 
trial judge at the time he passed upon the various motions for 
the admission of Seaggs to bail, that he did not give considera-
tion to the primary purpose of bail, but had in mind subjecting 
Scaggs to punishment forthwith regardless of the outcome of 
the appeal which he had taken from the judgment of convic-
tion. At no time did the trial judge intimate that his reason 
for refusing Scaggs bail pending appeal was that he enter-
tained the belief that Scaggs would fail to attend upon the 
court when his presence was required. It is obvious that the 
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did not entertain such a belief because he permitted 
to remain at large after conviction for over two 
months and over two weeks after pronouncing sentence on the 
bail -which Scaggs had posted prior to trial. In fact the 
record discloses that the only reasons given by the trial judge 
for refusing Scaggs bail pending appeal were that he wanted 
him to go to prison pending appeal because "Justice delayed is 
justice denied and I am not going to be a party to this man 's-
a convicted felon-roaming the streets for a month or two 
months until his case is decided on appeal" and that it was 
against his policy to grant bail in cases of this character. He 
also stated in his affidavit that: ''I considered the probation 
report, the apparent unreliability and dishonesty of the 
defendant, and certain strong indications that he had engaged 
in other criminal activities before, during and even after the 
trial, as factors weighing against his release. Lastly, in my 
judgment there were no such substantial errors of law involved 
in this trial as to present a substantial issue on appeal." I 
submit that the foregoing reasons are inadequate to justify the 
refusal to grant bail in a case of this character. 
In my long years of experience in law enforcement it was 
my observation that it was not at all unusual for convicted 
persons to be admitted to bail pending appeal in cases of this 
character, and I have no recollection of any of such persons 
ever failing to attend upon the court when his presence was 
required. In my opinion the only realm for the exercise of 
discretion in a case such as this is the amount which the trial 
judge believes to be commensurate with the risk assumed by 
the admission of the prisoner to bail, and not whether bail 
should be granted or refused. 
-we may take judicial notice that many criminal cases are 
reversed on appeal; that some of the defendants in such cases 
are never retried and others are acquitted upon retrial. "While 
it is true that every judgment of a court of record carries a 
presumption of validity, that presumption does not become 
conclusive until the judgment becomes final. A person con-
victed of a felony is not a felon as a matter of law until the 
judgment of conviction becomes finaL Appellate courts were 
established to review judgments of trial courts and set aside 
those which were not obtained pursuant to the rules of law 
declared in the Constitution and statutes of this state, and 
every person convicted of a crime has the right of appeal, 
and when an appeal is validly perfected and prosecuted, his 
conviction is not final until it is affirmed on appeaL It i"! a 
Nov.1956] IN RE ScAGGs 
[ 47 C.2d 416; 303 P.2d 1009] 
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salutary principle of American justice which the framers of 
both the federal and our state Constitutions wisely engrafted 
upon our fundamental law that all persons shall be bailable 
by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offenses when the proof 
is evident or the presumption great, and that excessive bail 
shall not be required (Cal. Const., art. I, § 6). This principle 
has been embraced in the Declaration of Rights of our Con-
stitution since its adoption and was intended as a fundamental 
safeguard to the liberty of the citizens of this state. It should 
be invoked and applied in all proper cases to the end that a 
person who is so unfortunate as to be unjustly convicted of 
crime may not be required to endure penal servitude until his 
conviction has become finaL 
For the foregoing reasons I would grant the writ of habeas 
corpus in the case at bar and order that Scaggs be released 
on bail in the sum of $10,000 pending his appeal from the 
judgment of conviction to which he is now subjected. 
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-In my view, upon the record 
presented to us, the defendant is prima facie entitled to be 
admitted to reasonable bail upon appeal. I find no factual 
basis for the implied finding that no conceivable amount of 
bail would secure the presence of defendant and his amena-
bility to the process of the court when required. Neither does 
the record support any other tenable ground for denying 
bail. Certainly the indicated objective of punishing the de-
fendant is not a valid ground for jailing him pending his 
appeal. Consequently, the absolute denial of an order fixing 
bail is an abuse of discretion (Cal. Const., art. I, § 6; In re 
Brumback (1956), 46 Cal.2d 810 [299 P.2d 217] ). 
